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This study investigates the factors determining the debt-ratios of listed companies on 
the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh stock exchange markets. Estimation analysis using panel 
data covering the three-year period from 2006 to 2008 reveals the following results. (1) 
The debt-ratios of listed companies may be well explained by adjusted Modigliani and  
Miller theory combined with agency cost theory. (2) In order to borrow long-term 
outside funds, the ability to provide collateral is very important, even for qualified and 
listed companies. (3) Government controlled companies have weak incentives to save 
corporate tax payments by using debt financing. (4) In term of long-term fundraising, 
government controlled companies are perceived to present less risk than other 
companies. (5) In the determinants of fundraising, there is almost no difference in the 
determinants of fundraising between companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh stock 
exchange and those on the Hanoi stock exchange. (6) Compared to the fundraising 
activities of small- and medium-sized companies analyzed by Nguyen (2006) and Biger 
et al. (2008), those of listed companies could be better explained by using standard 
corporate financing theory. These observations suggest several policy implications. (1) 
Economic reform (Doi Moi) policies have successfully built up market based corporate 
financing systems for listed companies in Vietnam; however, (2) the protection of 
outside creditors should be further enhanced, as should be the disclosure of corporate 
information. (3) Further liberalization and privatization of the banking sector is urgently 
needed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After implementing the “Doi Moi” (economic reforms)  policy Vietnam applied 
market mechanisms, and the economic structure has changed greatly. In order to 
multiply forms of possession, apply market mechanisms, and open the economy, the 
legal system has rapidly created many new laws such as the Private Company Law 
(1990), the State-owned Company Privatization Law (1990), the Company Law (2000), 
the Foreign Investment Law (2001), the Interest Rate Liberalization Law (2002), the 
Competition Law (2005), and others. In the period from 2000 to 2006, Vietnam’s 
economy experienced a growth rate higher than 7% and a growth rate of investment 
over 10% (ADB (2006)). Moreover, according to the result of a survey conducted in 
2007 by the Vietnam Statistics Bureau, the number of companies in Vietnam expanded 
from 420,000 companies in 2000 to 1,310,000 companies in 2006
1. 
In the economic reform process, it was important to restructure state/public ownership 
balance, which is thought to play an important role in economic development; the 
privatization of state-owned companies and the equitization of the private companies 
have been performed successfully. Furthermore, recognizing the importance of a stock 
market where companies can raise medium- and long-term funds, the Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Securities Exchange (HASE) were 
established in 2000 and 2005, respectively. Before the “Doi Moi,” there were 5,000 
state-owned companies. By the end of 2008, around 3,000 of those had been equitized. 
In addition, the number of listed companies increased rapidly to 340 companies at the 
end of 2008. 
In the period of transition, understanding whether the types of companies that played 
a major role in domestic investment could raise funds effectively is crucial to 
marketizing Vietnamese economy. There have been many studies on the fund 
mobilization of companies in Central European countries and China that have 
experienced economic transition. In contrast, there are very few analyses of the actual 
nature of the fundraising activity of Vietnamese companies, and the characteristics and 
the problems of this activity. 
Nguyen (2006), who studied empirically the fundraising structure of Vietnamese 
small and medium companies, conducted the first study of this field in Vietnam. In 
addition, Biger, N., Nguyen, N.V. and Hoang, Q.X. (2008) studied the financial 
structure of Vietnamese companies by using data from the company census conducted 
by the Vietnamese Statistics Bureau in 2002 and 2003. These studies clarified the 
                                                  
1 Obtained from the homepage of the Vietnamese Statistics Bureau (http://www.gso.gov.vn/).  3
financial structure of companies under an imperfect policy environment, so the 
perspective of the financial activity of the Vietnamese companies remains largely 
unexplained. 
The purpose of this study is to clarify the characteristics of the fundraising structures 
of the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and Hanoi Securities Exchange listed 
companies that are representative companies of Vietnam and raising funds in the best 
policy environment. 
Concretely, this study attempts to explain these two problems by using current 
standard corporate finance theories. (1) What are the characteristics of the fundraising 
structure of listed companies in such a transitional economy such as Vietnam, in 
comparison with those in developed economies. (2) What factors can explain the 
differences between the fundraising structures of Vietnamese listed companies and those 
of developed economies. In addition, this study attempts to suggest necessary policies 
for increasing the effectiveness of Vietnamese corporate finance.According to empirical 
analysis, the fundraising structures of Vietnamese listed companies are well explained 
by the corrected MM theory (trade-off theory) and agency cost approach, and are more 
coincided with corporate finance theories in comparison with Nguyen (2006) and Biger 
et al. (2008). In addition, fundraising determinants of state-owned companies are 
different from other companies: collaterals for external loans are less important and 
impact of corporation tax is weak. On the other hand, no statistical difference in 
fundraising determinants is observed between the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange 
listed companies and the Hanoi Securities Exchange listed companies. The 
characteristics of the Vietnamese listed company, which became clear in this study, 
suggest that the economic reform of Vietnam, whose goal was market economization, 
has already achieved certain successes in corporate finance. On the other hand, in order 
to improve information asymmetry, information disclosure reinforcement, creditor 
protection, privatization and competition, the promotion policy of the banking sector 
should be promoted more. 
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general view of 
Vietnamese listed companies. Section 3 presents the theoretical analysis framework 
used to explain the fundraising structures of Vietnamese listed companies and sets 
hypotheses. Section 4 surveys the characteristics of the management activities of 
Vietnamese listed companies. Section 5 explains the empirical analysis and estimation 
method. Section 6 discusses the empirical results compared to those of Nguyen (2006) 
and Biger et al. (2008). Section 7 summarizes the contents of this study and suggests a 
future research theme.  4
 
2. Vietnamese Company Reforms and Listed Companies 
2.1 Corporate Sector Reform in Vietnam 
After implementing the “Doi Moi” policy in 1986, the application of market 
mechanisms has been implemented in Vietnam. With the purposes of multiplying forms 
of possession, applying market mechanisms, and opening the economy, many new laws, 
such as the Private Company Law (1990), the State-owned Company Privatization Law 
(1990), the Company Law (2000), the Foreign Investment Law (2001), the Interest Rate 
Liberalization Law (2002), the Competition Law (2005), and others have been quickly 
implemented. 
In order to restructure company organization, which plays an important role in the 
economic development along with the “Doi Moi,” the privatization of state-owned 
companies and the equitization of the private companies have been performed 
successfully, reducing the number of state-owned companies from 5,000 in 1990 since 
the privatization of state-owned companies began in 1992. 
 
(Table 2-1) Privatization of State-owned Companies in Vietnam 
 
With the exception of special industries that remain government controlled, the 
privatization of state-owned companies has been carried out beginning with those of 
comparatively small scale and with a good chance of achieving business efficiency. As 
Table 2-1 shows, the industries that remain in government control have gradually 
decreased, and the number of privatized companies has increased. Before the “Doi 
Moi,” there were around 5,000 state-owned companies, but by the end of 2008, about 
3,000 of those had been privatized. The remaining 2,000 state-owned companies were 
scheduled for privatization by the end of 2010. 
In many Vietnamese companies, the government became the controlling stockholder 
after they were equitized and influenced company activities. According to the latest 
State-owned Company Law (Luật doanh nghiệp nhà nước), enacted November 26, 2003, 
in addition to companies where the government invests 100%, those stock-issuing 
companies in which the government invests more than 50% are classified as state-
owned (state-controlled) companies. 
Along with company reforms based on the “Doi Moi,” other reforms targeting 
marketization of the economy, such as banking reform, liberalization of interest rates, 
opening the stock market to foreign capital, and others, have been initiated (Assistant 
Table 1). Before the “Doi Moi,” interest rate regulation was conducted under the  5
monobank system, and the real interest rate was negative. After the “Doi Moi” began, 
the functions of the state bank and commercial banks were separated, and the interest 
rate was gradually liberalized. Stock markets were opened to foreign investors fairly 
early in the period. Although there are limits on the participation of foreign investors, 
they now play an important role in Vietnamese stock markets. 
 
2.2 Vietnamese Securities Exchanges and Listed Companies 
Stock listing is the final stage of the privatization process in Vietnam. On July 10, 
1998, it was decided to establish securities exchanges in Hanoi City and Ho Chi Minh 
City as stock markets for companies to raise mid- and long-term funds. The Ho Chi 
Minh Securities Exchange and the Hanoi Securities Exchange were opened on July 14. 
2000 and on July 28, 2005, respectively.  
According to the Securities Law (Luật Chứng khoán) enacted on January 19, 2007, 
listing conditions on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange are stricter than those of 
Hanoi Securities Exchange (Table 2-2). In order to be listed on the Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchange, companies need to have more minimum capital, better business 
performance, and a more dispersed stock holding structure. 
 
(Table 2-2) Listing Conditions for the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 
 
The number of listed companies, the amount of buying and selling, the trading value, 
the aggregate market value of the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and the Hanoi 
Securities Exchange are summarized in Table 2-3. After the establishment of the 
securities exchanges, the number of listed companies failed to rise for several years. 
When the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange first opened, only 5 companies were listed. 
Although the Hanoi Securities Exchange was established after that, the number of listed 
companies totaled only 41 for both markets at the end of 2005. 
 
(Table 2-3) The Number, Trading Amount, and Market Value of Listed Companies 
 
According to Table 2-4, upon the establishment of stock markets, corporate tax 
preferential systems were established for listed companies in order to promote listing, 
but companies did not react positively. However, along with the participant of Vietnam 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the tax preferential system for conventional 
listed companies, which halved the corporate tax for the first two years after listing, was 
designated in October 2006 to be canceled beginning January 1, 2007, which spurred a  6
rush of listings by companies hoping for preferential taxation. At the end of 2006, 187 
companies were listed. This rapid increase in the number of listed companies and the 
rapid growth of the stock market attracted attention, and funds flowed into the market 
from the foreign countries. As a result, many companies favored such a market 
environment and increased capital by issuing new stock, so that at the end of 2007, the 
ratio of the aggregate market value to the GDP was 43.7%. At the end of 2008, the 
number of listed companies in both markets was 340. 
 
(Table 2-4) Corporate Tax on Listed Companies in Vietnam  
 
Table 2-5 shows a breakdown of the number of listed companies by industry at the 
end of 2008. Most Vietnamese listed companies are manufacturing and construction 
companies, respectively forming 36% and 28% of all listed companies. The rest are 
companies in such industries as agricultural fishery, mining, electricity, services, 
transportation, finance and banking, communication, real estate, commerce, and others. 
In the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange, the proportion of manufacturing companies 
is the highest, and the proportions of transportation companies, commerce companies, 
and agriculture fishery companies are also relatively high. On the Hanoi Securities 
Exchange, however, construction companies and manufacturing companies comprise, 
respectively, 40% and 30% of the total, while other industries are only sparsely 
represented. 
 
(Table 2-5) Breakdown of Listed Companies by Industry  
 
2.3 Problems of Fundraising for Vietnamese Listed Companies 
Listing of companies is the final stage of the company reform process, in the hope 
that they will be able to raise funds effectively through the market. However, the 
financial environment surrounding listed companies continues to have many problems 
in spite of recent rapid economic reform. 
First, it is obvious that the Vietnamese government still wields a strong influence on 
the listed company sector. Even among listed companies on the Ho Chi Minh Securities 
Exchange and the Hanoi Securities Exchange, where listing is the last process of 
company reform, more than 30% of them are state-controlled companies
2. These 
companies are assumed to be able to use close relations with the government to get 
                                                  
2  Among 211 companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Echange or the Hanoi Secuirities 
Exhange by the end of 2007, the number of state-controlled companies was 84 in 2007.  7
loans with advantageous conditions, but risk ineffective fund-raising ineffectively 
because of their weak motivation to minimize expenses. 
Second, reform of the banking sector is still not sufficient. In Vietnam, banking 
reform has been implemented along with company reform. Separation of the functions 
of the state banks and commercial banks and the liberalization of interest rates have 
been carried out steadily (Table A1 in Appendix). As a result, the banking sector has 
also been marketized; the selection of borrowers and the setting of financing conditions 
have become more economically rational to reflect profitability and the risks of 
financing. However, the state-owned banks dominate the banking sector, which still 
provides most of the supply of domestic funds, and it is observed that there remain close 
relationships between state-owned companies and state-owned banks. Therefore, in 
terms of raising funds, state-controlled companies have more advantages than non-state-
controlled companies, and are able to get funds regardless of economic rationality, as 
they could before the reforms. 
Third, company information disclosure is insufficient among unlisted companies, and 
the negative effects of this problem cause concern about the fundraising activities of 
listed companies. Vietnamese stock markets were established so that excellent 
companies can easily raise middle- and long-term funds. However, enough company 
information must be disclosed to investors so that appropriate fund distribution can 
occur in the market. According to Nguyen (2006) and Biger et al. (2008), fund 
mobilization in Vietnamese small and medium sized companies does not accord with 
many aspects of corporate finance theory as a result of the information asymmetry 
caused by insufficient company information disclosure by listed, as well as fully state-
controlled, companies. 
Fourth, institutional investors in Vietnamese stock markets are immature. The 
existence of institutional investors with long-term investment goals is necessary for the 
stock market to serve its original function as the supply source of mid- and long-term 
funds. Liberalization has been implemented in Vietnamese securities exchanges by such 
measures as accepting the participation of foreign investors. However, in Vietnam, 
institutional investors such as life insurance companies and pension funds have not yet 
developed. Therefore, there is a concern that rational resource allocation is not at 
present made from long-term perspectives. 
 
3. Analysis of the Fundraising Structure of Listed Companies in Vietnam 
3.1 Literature Review 
Regarding the problem of the fundraising structure of a transitional economy, there  8
are many studies about Eastern European countries and China. These studies focus on 
various influences of the government on the market and companies to examine 
corporate activities, based on the corrected MM theory, the agency cost approach, and 
the pecking order approach. 
For example, Delcoure (2007) analyzed listed companies of the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Russia, and Slovakia, and showed that the fundraising structures of these 
nations’ companies was explained by a corrected pecking order theory, which has the 
priorities of internal reserves, equities, bank borrowing, and bonds. Bauer (2004) 
analyzed Czech Republic listed companies and concluded that the fundraising 
determinants of these companies could be explained by the same economic factors as 
those of developed nations like the G7 countries. Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997) 
analyzed Polish listed companies, and clarified that the concentration of stockholders 
has favorable influences on the debt ratio of companies, and that big companies, new 
companies, and foreign-affiliated companies tended to have higher debt ratios. Colombo 
(2001) analyzed Hungarian listed companies and showed that the fundraising structure 
of these companies was explained by the pecking order theory. 
There are also many studies about the fundraising structure of Chinese companies. 
Jean (2004) considered the fundraising structure of Chinese listed companies and 
explained it with a corrected pecking order theory with priorities of internal reserves, 
equities, and long-term borrowing. In addition, Guihai and Frank (2006) showed that 
the fundraising determinants of developed as well as developing countries can also be 
applied to Chinese listed companies and even if the company is state-controlled or not, 
had no influence on the fundraising structure of Chinese companies, and the taxation 
system strongly influenced long-term borrowing by Chinese companies. 
There is very little econometric analysis of Vietnamese corporate finance. Nguyen 
(2006) studied the earliest achievements of the fundraising structure of Vietnamese 
companies. Nguyen (2006) used data from 1998 to 2001 for 558 small- and medium-
sized companies with fewer than 300 employees and less than 10,000,000,000 VND 
capital to estimate the determinants of debt ratio, short-term debt ratio, and short-term 
debt except for the bank borrowing ratio. The results of the analysis clarified the 
following problems: (1) The average debt ratio of Vietnamese small- and medium-sized 
companies was 43.9%. (2) The debt ratio of state-owned companies was higher than 
that of non-state-owned companies; larger companies had higher debt ratios; companies 
with high growth rates or high business risks had higher debt ratio; debt ratio and fixed 
assets had a reverse correlation; and a company’s profitability had no effect on its debt 
ratio. (3) Relations with banks and networks of managers was an important determinant  9
of a company’s debt ratio of; the stronger these relations are, the easier fundraising 
becomes. 
Biger, N., Nguyen, N.V. and Hoang, Q.X. (2008) used company survey data from 
2002 and 2003 research conducted by the Vietnamese Statistics Bureau to study the 
fundraising structure. Samples consisted of 3,778 companies chosen from the survey 
data and having over 10 employees. It was observed from the results of the analysis that 
(1) the long-term debt ratio of Vietnamese companies was limited at 20%, and there was 
little long-term investment, with low long-term profitability; (2) the debt ratio of 
companies had positive correlation with their scale of business as well as the percentage of 
their total stock issued that is owned by managers, but had negative correlation with profitability 
and depreciation; (3) the debt ratio had negative correlations with fixed assets and the 
corporate tax rate, and also with growth opportunity. 
Nguyen (2006) and Biger et al. (2008) focused on companies that operate primarily 
in an imperfect financial environment, but our paper studies the fundraising 
determinants of listed companies on the Hanoi Securities Exchange and the Ho Chi 
Minh Securities Exchange, that are able to operate in a perfect financial system in 
Vietnam.  
 
3.2 The Analysis Framework for Vietnamese Listed Companies 
(1) Trade-off Theory 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) (the MM theory), under such assumptions 
as a perfect capital market, no corporation tax, information symmetry, zero transaction 
cost, exogenous profitability, and company value being independent of capital structure, 
the fundraising structure has no impact on company value. However, in reality, the 
assumptions of the MM theory are not in effect. Let us examine the differences of 
reality from the MM theory, and their effects on Vietnamese corporate reform.  
Corporation tax: According to Modigliani and Miller (1963), when a company has to pay 
corporate tax, it should raise funds by debts, such as bank borrowing or bonds, rather 
than equities, thus eliminating the payment of corporation tax, and allowing it to raise 
its value by that amount. In addition, as shown in chapter 2, preferential taxation was 
granted to companies newly listed on the Stock Exchange before 2007. Preferential 
taxation by the Corporate Tax Law enacted in 2003 also applied. Therefore, it is 
possible that the effective tax rate differs considerably among listed companies. It is 
expected that companies with higher effective tax rates tend to prefer financing by debts 
such as bonds or bank loans. However, if depreciation or a non-debt tax shield, such as 
other tax deductions, is available, the motivation to save tax payments through debt will  10
decrease. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The effective tax rate correlates positively with the debt ratio of listed 
companies. 
Hypothesis 1b: The non-debt tax shield correlates negatively with the debt ratio of 
listed companies. 
 
Bankruptcy risk: Because the possibility of business failures rises when the debt ratio 
of the company rises, payment of the risk premium for mobilizing funds by debt also 
rises. Because higher bankruptcy risk raises the cost of financing by debt, the debt ratio 
is expected to be lower. Generally, the bigger the company, the smaller the business 
reductions by exogenous shocks, so the bankruptcy risk becomes lower. Therefore, the 
larger the business scale and the smaller the business risk, the higher the debt ratio tends 
to become. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The scale of the listed company and the debt ratio have positive 
correlation. 
 
(2) Economic Factors Relating to Agency Cost 
Besides corporate tax and business risk, when information asymmetry exists, agency 
cost has an important influence on the determination of corporate value, namely the 
decision on the most suitable capital structure of the company
3. Since Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), the problems of the conflict 
between the benefits to stockholders (clients) and managers (agents) and between 
creditors (clients) and stockholders (agents), which are factors of the agency cost, have 
attracted much attention.
4 
                                                  
3 The agency cost theory is known to concentrate on the necessary costs to adjust the contradiction 
among managers, stocktakers and creditors. The trade-off theory is known to improvie upon the MM 
theory by considering the merits and disadvantages of increasing debt. There is also the signaling 
theory, which analyzes the capital structure problem by information economics and the pecking 
order theory.  
4 The agency problem is influenced by the differences in the economic environments surrounding the 
companies. When it is difficult to observe managers’ actions from outside, the growth or investment 
opportunities of the company are few, free cashflow of the company is high, or the liquidation value 
of the company is large, the conflict of interests between stockholders (clients) and managers 
(agents) worsens. Furthermore, when the bankruptcy cost to the company is high, or stockholders 
can easily change the assets structure and the  dividend policy of the company to favor of 
themselves, the conflict of interests between creditors (clients) and stockholders (agents) becomes 
serious. The degree of disclosure of company information and the  information asymmetry of  11
Internal funds: On the other hand, the problem of the agency cost between creditors 
(clients) and stockholders (agents) comes from the moral hazards that occur 
stockholders apply debt funds to dividends, or make high-risk/high-return investments 
under the limited liability system to get high dividends. In this case, it is desirable to 
reduce the debt ratio of a company to reduce the problem and to raise corporate value. 
Therefore, companies with abundant internal funds will tend to reduce dependence on 
the externally borrowed money. Because it is thought that the higher the business return 
rate is, the greater the internal funds are; it is expected that the debt ratio of such 
companies decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The debt ratio of the listed company decreases as business return rate 
increases. 
 
Collateral: When borrowing externally, the more severe the information asymmetry 
between the managers of the company and the outside creditors is, the higher the agency 
cost of mobilizing funds through debt is. An effective method to reduce the agency cost 
of debt financing is to offer collateral to the creditors. The more collateral a company 
can offer, the lower the agency cost of debt financing becomes, so the higher the debt 
ratio of the company can rise. From this point of view, it is expected that the more the 
assets the company can offer as collateral, the higher its debt ratio is. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The debt ratio of listed companies rises with the value of the collateral 
that they can offer. 
 
Business growth: The issue of agency between stockholders (clients) and managers 
(agents) arises as stockholders expect the maximization of company value while 
managers pursue personal profit for themselves. If a company’s growth is high, 
managers will seek to increase their earnings by raising the company’s profits rather 
than pursuing personal profit from company. On the other hand, if company’s growth is 
low, managers are going to increase their earnings by pursuing their personal profit from 
company, because increasing the company’s profits becomes harder. Therefore, low-
growth companies tend to increase financing through debt to prevent managers from 
plundering the profits of company. From this point of view, it is expected that the lower 
the business growth is, the higher the company’s debt ratio becomes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
corporate management also greatly influence the agency cost.  12
Hypothesis 5: The lower (higher) the business growth of listed companies, the higher 
(lower) their debt ratio becomes. 
 
(3) Influences of Company Characteristics 
State control: There are many state-controlled companies among Vietnamese listed 
companies. These companies are thought to be different from non-state-controlled 
companies in their fundraising structure. 
First, the government tacitly guarantees state-controlled companies; thus, their 
business risk is smaller than that of non-controlled companies. Therefore, it is expected 
that the debt ratio of state-controlled companies is higher than that of non-controlled 
companies. 
Second, it is thought that state-controlled companies’ incentive to increase debt to 
save corporate tax payment is different from non-controlled companies. From the 
viewpoint of government, which is a 50% stockholder in state-controlled companies, 
corporate tax payment is an income to the government itself, thus their incentive to use 
debt to save corporate tax payments is less than that of other stockholders. Therefore, 
the debt ratio of state-controlled companies is lower than that of non-state-controlled 
companies. 
Third, it is thought that state-controlled companies have closer relations with state-
owned banks than other companies. Vietnam’s four major state-owned banks provide 
78% of the financing of entire whole economy, and more than a half of that amount is 
provided to state-owned companies (Nguyen (2006)). Due to these relations, it is easier 
for state-controlled companies to access loans from state-owned banks regardless of the 
quantity of collateral they offer, and the influence of collateral on the debt ratio is 
smaller in case of state-controlled companies than other companies. In addition, for 
state-controlled companies, the difference between the agency cost of external debt and 
the agency cost of internal funds is small, so the influence of internal reserves on the 
debt ratio is smaller than in other companies. 
 
Hypothesis 6a: The fact that state-controlled companies are tacitly guaranteed by the 
government could have the effect of raising the debt ratios of state-
controlled companies. 
Hypothesis 6b: The fact that state-controlled companies’ incentive to save tax 
payments by using debt is weak could have the effect of decreasing 
their debt ratio.  
Hypothesis 6c: Furthermore, the fact that state-controlled companies have close  13
relations with state-owned banks could have the effect of increasing 
their debt ratio. 
 
Listing securities exchange differences: Listing standards are different between the 
Hanoi Securities Exchange and the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange. Compared to 
Hanoi Securities Exchange listed companies, the capital scale of Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchange listed companies is larger, and as a result, so are the sales amounts 
and fixed assets scales. According to the trade off theory, the higher the bankruptcy risk 
is, the lower the debt ratio is. Thus, Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange listed companies 
whose bankruptcy risks are low have higher debt ratios in comparison to Hanoi 
Securities Exchange listed companies. 
Listing standards of the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange are stricter than those of 
the Hanoi Securities Exchange; therefore, Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange listed 
companies’ credibility in market is higher. Hence, the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange 
listed companies can raise funds from outside creditors more easily, regardless of the 
quantity of their collateral, and the effect of collateral on the debt ratio is smaller than 
that of Hanoi Securities Exchange listed companies. In addition, for Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchange listed companies, as the difference between the agency cost of 
financing from outside creditors and that of internal funds is small, it is thought that the 
effect of internal reserves on the debt ratio is less than it is for Hanoi Securities 
Exchange listed companies. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The fact the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange listed companies satisfy 
stricter listing standards than do the Hanoi Securities Exchange listed 
companies has the effect of increasing the debt ratio of Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchange listed companies in comparison to that of Hanoi 
Securities Exchange listed companies. 
 
4. Method of Estimation 
4.1 Estimation Function 
Like Rajan and Zingales (1995), this paper estimates debt ratio, which is the most 
basic index demonstrating the capital structure of companies. Yit is an explained variable, 
Xjit represents the explanatory variables (j=1,2,…, k ),  STATE is the state-controlled 
company dummy, HOSE is the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange listed company 
dummy. α is the fixed effect, βj、γj、φj are coefficients (j=1,2,…, k), ε is the matrix of 































            (1) 
 
(1) Explained Variables  
We used four debt ratios as explained variables: Total debt ratio (DR), Long-term debt 
ratio (LDR), Long-term bank loan ratio (LBR), and Short-term debt ratio (SDR). 
Total debt ratio (DR) expresses the ratio that fundraising by debt holds in the entire 
funding of company, and it is the most basic index of the fundraising structure. Because 
of the effects of saving tax payments and bankruptcy risk on finance structure (= debt 
ratio) relates to the whole debt; using the debt ratio is considered appropriate to observe 
the influences of these factors on the fundraising structure. We calculated Total debt 
ratio (DR) by dividing the amount of total debts by the amount of total assets. 
Short-term debts, such as accounts payable or bills used as methods of balancing 
short-term funds and long-term debts used for long-term investments, as for equipment, 
have different characteristics. Accounts payable and bills relate to clients, so the 
information asymmetry of fundraising by accounts payable and bills is comparatively 
small. On the other hand, information asymmetry between firms and creditors of long-
term debt is larger. Thus, the influence of the agency cost of long-term debt on capital 
structure is stronger than that of short-term debt. We calculated the Long-term debt ratio 
(LDR) by dividing the total long-term debt amount (debt period is more than one year) 
by the total assets amount. The short-term debt ratio (SDR) was calculated by dividing 
the total short-term debt amount (debt period is less than one year) by the total assets 
amount. 
 
(2) Explanatory Variables 
We used (i) corporate tax rate and firm scale based on the corrected MM theory 
(trade-off theory), (ii) operating income ratio, fixed assets ratio, and Tobin’s Q based on 
the agency cost approach, and (iii) the state-controlled company dummy, the Ho Chi 
Minh listed company dummy, industry dummies and other control variables expressing 
characteristics of Vietnamese listed companies as explanatory variables. 
Effective tax rate (TAX): We used this effective corporate tax rate to observe the 
influence of saving tax payments upon debts. The greater the amount of corporate tax 
that a company actually paid is, the higher the debt ratio theoretically becomes to save  15
tax payments. The effective corporate tax rate is defined as the ratio of the amount of 
corporation tax payment divided by the amount of operating income
5. 
Non-debt tax shield ratio (NDTS): The higher the non-debt saving tax payment 
frameworks are, the lower is the incentive to use debt to save tax payments. This 
variable is defined as the ratio obtained by dividing the total amount of depreciation and 
other tax deductions by the amount of total assets. 
Business scale (SIZE): Business scale can be interpreted as a proxy variable for the 
bankruptcy risk of companies. Because the bigger the business scale is, the greater 
business diversification and risk dispersion could be, bankruptcy risk accompanying 
debt decreases; thus, it is easier for large-scale businesses to increase debts.
6 
Operating income ratio (PROF): This operating income ratio is used as a proxy 
variable for free cash-flow. Because free cash-flow is the source of funds whose agency 
cost is the lowest, it is the first used by the company. Therefore, it is thought that 
companies with more free cash-flow tend to decrease their debt ratio. Operating income 
ratio is defined as the ratio obtained by dividing the amount of operating income (the 
total amount of profit before interest payment and tax payment) by the amount of total 
assets. Because there is no operating income term in the financial reports of Vietnamese 
companies, we calculated operating income by totaling profits before taxes and interest 
payment amounts
7. 
Fixed assets rate (TANG): We used the fixed assets rate as a proxy variable for the 
ability to provide collateral. Because fixed assets are easy to screen and monitor, they 
are preferred to other assets as collateral. By using fixed assets as collateral, information 
asymmetry between creditors and firms decreases, so the agency cost associated to 
financing by debts falls, and companies can more easily increase debt. The fixed assets 
rate is defined as the ratio of the total fixed assets amount divided by the total assets 
amount. The amount of fixed assets here includes the amount of both tangible and 
intangible fixed assets
8. 
Business growth (GROWTH): We used Tobin’s Q (the ratio of dividing the total 
amount of debts and the present value of stocks by the book value of total assets) as a 
proxy variable for the business growth of companies. The higher business growth is, the 
                                                  
5 Guihai and Frank (2006) used the same variables. 
6 Business scale is used as a proxy variable of a company’s recognition in the market. The better 
known to society the company is, the lower information asymmetry between outside creditors and 
company becomes. Thus, agency cost decreases and the company can raise debt more easily. The 
natural logarithm of the total assets is used as the proxy variable for business scale (for example, 
Jean (2004)). The natural logarithm of sales is also often used as a proxy variable for business scale. 
7 Guihai and Frank (2006) and Wiwattanakantang (1999) used the same variables. 
8 Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wiwattanakantang (1999) used the same variables.  16
weaker the incentive for managers to plunder personal profit from the company 
becomes, so the agency cost of financing by stock shrinks. Therefore, it is expected that 
the higher the business growth is, the lower company’s debt ratio becomes. 
State-controlled company dummy (STATE): This is one of the dummy variables 
stating the characteristics of Vietnamese firms. As explained in Chapter 2, among 
Vietnamese listed companies, there are many state-controlled companies, more than 
50% of whose stock is held by the government. These companies have closer relations 
with state-owned banks and therefore, access loans much more easily from these banks, 
as compared to other companies. Also, because corporate tax becomes an income of 
government, the incentive to use debts to save tax payments from state-controlled 
companies is weaker than that of other companies. The state-controlled company 
dummy takes 1 for companies whose government stock holding is more than 50%, and 
takes 0 for the others. 
Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange listed company dummy (HOSE): As explained in 
Chapter 2, the listing standards of the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and the Hanoi 
Securities Exchange are different. Compared to the Hanoi Securities Exchange listed 
companies, Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange listed companies have larger business 
scales, better business achievements, and lower bankruptcy risk and agency costs, so 
they are thought to be able to increase debt easily. The Ho Chi Minh Securities 
Exchange listed company dummy takes 1 for companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchange and takes 0 for companies listed on the Hanoi Securities Exchange. 
Year dummy (YD2007): In 2006, the listings on the Vietnamese securities exchanges 
grew rapidly. Vietnamese stock markets attracted domestic and foreign investors, and 
the liquidity of stock markets increased. Therefore, in 2007 Vietnamese listed 
companies raised funds by publishing new stocks aggressively. On the other hand, in 
2008, the stock market turned worse due to the influences of the non-stabilization of the 
Vietnamese economy and the stagnation of the world economy caused by the issue of 
sub-prime loans. In order to control the influences of the macroeconomy, we used a year 
dummy variable that takes 1 for the year 2007, and takes 0 for the other years. 
Industry dummies: In order to control for influences on fundraising strategies unique 
to different industries, we used such industry dummy variables as construction industry 
(CONS), manufacturing industry (MANU), mining industry (MIN), electricity industry 
(POWE), services (SERV), communications (COMM), real estate (REAL), and 
commerce (COM). Because laws and regulations or degrees of information disclosure 
differ among industries, the agency cost of debt may also vary among industries
9. 
                                                  
9 For example, in order to be listed on Hanoi Securities Exchange, infrastructure companies do not  17
 
4.2  The Data Set 
The samples we used in the analysis are the non-financial companies listed on the Ho 
Chi Minh Securities Exchange or the Hanoi Securities Exchange before 2007, for which 
we can get the necessary data for at least two continuous years, from 2006 to 2008. 
Financial institutions were excluded from the sample because determinants of their 
capital structure are different from those of non-financial institutions. The data before 
2005 was excluded from the sample because it was too small in comparison with the 
data since 2006, and thus made estimation results biased. The necessary data was 
acquired from the annual financial reports of listed companies that were disclosed on 
the Web pages of the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and the Hanoi Securities 
Exchange
10. 
There were 141 companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and 110 
companies listed on the Hanoi Securities Exchange before 2007. Among of these, 116 
non-financial companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and 95 non-
financial companies listed on the Hanoi Securities Exchange were included in the 
samples. The total sample was 211 non-financial companies. 
Table 4-1 breaks down the sample by industry and state-control status of the company 
for each stock market. Most of companies in the sample are in the manufacturing and 
construction industries. The number of companies in the transportation industry, 
commerce, service, and agriculture follow the two leaders in descending order of 
quantity. On the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange, the proportion of manufacturing 
companies is the greatest, followed by construction companies and transportation 
companies. On the other hand, on the Hanoi Securities Exchange, the proportion of 
construction companies is the greatest, and is followed by manufacturing companies; 
the proportion of companies in other industries is very small. In addition, of the 84 
state-controlled companies, 31 companies were on the Ho Chi Minh Securities 
Exchange, and 53 companies were on the Hanoi Stock Exchange. 
 
(Table 4-1) Breakdown of the Sample by Industry and State-control of the Company 
 
Tables 4-2 shows the characteristics of the main variables used in the analysis by 
using the sample of 211 companies. The sample was divided into four groups by stock 
                                                                                                                                                  
have to satisfy the condition that one year before listing must be profitable, thus the Hanoi Securities 
Exchange listed construction companies are thought to have less free cashflow and a higher debt 
ratio than other companies. See table 2-1 for more detail. 
10 http://www.hsx.vn, http://www.hastc.org.vn   18
markets and state-control of the company. 
 
(Table 4-2) Comparison of State-controlled and Non-state-controlled Companies 
 
4.3 Estimation Method 
Nguyen (2006) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) used four-year average value of both 
explained variables and explanatory variables for estimation. Booth et al. (2001), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Lee (2000), Suto (2001) used simultaneous explained 
variables and explanatory variables for estimation. However, in this study we take a one 
period lag for explanatory variables in comparison with explained variables. 
Representative analysis methods for panel data are the Ordinary Least Squares 
method (OLS), the random effect model and the fixed effect model. However, samples 
used in this study are 211 companies for two-year or three-year periods. After taking the 
lag, the periods become one year or two years. There are 90 companies with only a one-
year period. Because time series are too short in comparison with cross sections, 
estimation results of the fixed effect model become too dependent on the fixed effect 
and are therefore improper. For this reason, we did not use the fixed effect method. In 
order to find out whether the OLS method or the random effect method is more proper, 
we performed the Lagrange Multiplier Test (LM test) in which OLS is the null 
hypothesis (Kitamura (2005)). 
 
4.4 Basic Statistics 
 Table 4-3 demonstrates the basic statistics of the main variables. The average debt ratio 
of Vietnamese listed companies is 47%, approximately same as that of Chinese listed 
companies (50%) as shown in Guihai and Frank (2006). However, the variance of debt 
ratio among Vietnamese listed companies is high. The average long-term debt ratio of 
Vietnamese listed companies is below 10%, approximately same as that of Chinese 
listed companies (7%) as shown in Jean (2004). The average fixed assets rate of 
Vietnamese listed companies is 30%, slightly lower than that of Chinese listed 
companies (34%) as shown in Guihai and Frank (2006). In contrast, the average 
operating income ratio of Vietnamese listed companies is 10%, higher than the ratio of 
5.7% of Chinese listed companies (Guihai and Frank (2006)). Finally, the average 
effective corporate tax rate of Vietnamese listed companies is 11%, much smaller than 
the official rate of 28%, which means that most of Vietnamese listed companies enjoyed 
tax preference. 
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(Table 4-3) Basic Statistics of the Main Variables 
 
5. Estimation Results and Discussion 
5.1 Estimation Results of the Model with the Non-debt Tax Shields Variable 
 (1) Estimation Results of Total Debt Ratio  
Table 5-1 summarizes the estimation results of debt ratios. The coefficient of 




(Table 5-1) Estimation Results of Total Debt Ratio, Long-term Debt Ratio, 
Long-term Bank Loan Ratio, and Short-term Debt Ratio. 
 
Investigating the impacts of the corrected MM theory based factors, we saw that the 
sign of corporate tax rate (TAX) is positive, agreeing with the hypothesis, while the sign 
of the non-debt tax shields (NDTS) is positive, contrary to hypothesis. However, both 
are insignificant. The business scale (SIZE) is significantly positive, agreeing with the 
hypothesis. This means that business risk is a determinant of capital structure. 
Investigating the impacts of the agency cost based factors, we saw that only the 
coefficient of operating income rate (PROF) is significantly negative, as per the 
hypothesis. This means that firms with high internal funding, whose agency cost is 
thought to be lowest, tend to have lower external debts. Other than those findings, the 
impact of the fixed assets rate (TANG) and business growth (GROWTH) were found to 
be insignificant. 
Investigating the influences of state control, we saw that coefficients of STATE*TAX 
and STATE*TANG are negative at the significant levels of 10% and 1%, respectively. 
This means that in comparison with other companies, state-controlled companies have a 
weaker incentive to save on tax payments and so raise less funds through collateralized 
debt. 
Investigating the influences of different stock markets, we did not see any significant 
coefficient. This means that despite different listing standards, the Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchange listed companies and the Hanoi Securities Exchange listed 
companies have no difference in fundraising structures. 
As for other factors, the 2007 year dummy and the real estate industry dummy are 
                                                  
11 Next, take the LM test where Pool OLS Model is null hypothesis and random effect model is 
opposite hypothesis. X
2 estimator with degree of freedom 210 is 658.561, thus null hypothesis is 
rejected at significant level of 1%. Therefore, random effect model was used to estimate.  20
positive at significant levels of 1% and 5% respectively. This means that the downward 
trend of the economy 2008 caused listed companies to face difficulties in raising funds 
through debt. In Vietnam, construction companies tend to have higher debt ratio in any 
case. 
 
(2) Estimation Results of Long-term Debt Ratio 
The coefficient of determination is 0.245, and the F statistic is 4.926, so the model can 
be said to be proper
12. In comparison with the estimation results for the total debt ratio, 
the estimation results of the long-term debt ratio agree better with the theoretical 
hypotheses. 
Investigating impacts of the corrected MM theory based factors, we found that the 
coefficients of business scale (SIZE) and corporate tax rate (TAX) are both significantly 
positive. This means that large-scale companies will be less risky, so they find it easier 
to obtain long-term loans. If the corporate tax rate is high, non-state-controlled 
companies tend to borrow more long-term debt to save on tax payments. 
Investigating the influences of agency cost theory based factors, we found that the 
coefficient of the fixed assets rate (TANG) is significantly positive. This means that 
companies with high fixed assets will be able to provide considerable collateral to 
reduce their agency cost of debt, and thus be able to obtain long-term debts easily. We 
did not observe any significant effects of the operating income rate (PROF). 
Observing the impacts of state control, we found that the coefficient of the state-
controlled company dummy (STATE) is significantly negative, and that of STATE*SIZE 
is significantly positive. This means that compared to other companies, state-controlled 
companies are less dependent on long-term debt and are perceived to be less vulnerable 
to bankruptcy. 
Observing the impacts of different stock markets, we saw the same results as in the 
total debt ratio model, that there is no difference in long-term fundraising structures 
between Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange listed companies and Hanoi Securities 
Exchange listed companies. 
 
(3) Estimation Results of Long-term Bank Loan Ratio 
The coefficient of determination is 0.168, and the F statistic is 3.444, so the model can 
be said to be proper
13. As in the estimation results for long-term debt ratio, the 
                                                  
12 Take the LM test where Pool OLS Model is null hypothesis and random effect model is opposite 
hypothesis. The X
2 estimator with degree of freedom 210 is 930.415, thus null hypothesis is rejected 
at significant level of 1%. Therefore, random effect model was used to estimate. 
13 Take the LM test where Pool OLS model is the null hypothesis and the random effect model is the  21
estimation results for the long-term bank loan ratio also agree better with the theoretical 
hypotheses than did the estimation results for the total debt ratio. 
Investigating the impacts of Trade-off theory based factors, we saw that the 
coefficient of business scale (SIZE) is positive at the significant level of 5%. This means 
that large-scale companies have fewer business risks, and thus can more easily obtain 
bank loans. 
Investigating the impacts of agency cost theory based factors, we saw that the 
coefficient of the fixed assets ratio (TANG) is positive at the significant level of 1%, and 
that of business growth (GROWTH) is negative at the significant level of 5%. This 
means that companies with a high level of fixed assets can provide much collateral to 
reduce the agency cost of debt, and thus have easier access to long-term bank loans. 
Companies with high growth have a low agency cost of equity, and thus tend to have 
lower debt-financing. We did not observe any significant impact of the operating 
income rate (PROF). 
Observing the impacts of state control, we saw the same results as for the long-term 
debt ratio. The coefficient of the state-controlled company dummy (STATE) is 
significantly negative at the 5% level, and that of STATE*SIZE is significantly positive 
at the 5% level. This means that state-controlled companies are less dependent on long-
term debt and are perceived to be less vulnerable to bankruptcy than other companies. 
Observing the impacts of different stock markets, we found the same results as with 
total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio models, that there is no difference in the long-
term bank loan raising structures of Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange listed companies 
and Hanoi Securities Exchange listed companies. 
 
(4) Estimation Results of Short-term Debt Ratio 
The coefficient of determination is 0.266, and the F statistic is 4.490, so the model 
can be said to be proper
14. However, we observed no significant coefficients of the 
corrected MM theory based factors. 
As for agency cost based factors, only the operating income rate (PROF) is 
significantly negative. This means that companies with more internal reserves and 
whose agency cost is the least tend to carry lower debts. However, the coefficients of 
                                                                                                                                                  
opposite hypothesis. X
2 estimator with degree of freedom 210 is 1114.311; thus, the null hypothesis 
is rejected at the significant level of 1%. Therefore, the random effect model was used to estimate.   
14 Take the LM test where Pool OLS model is the null hypothesis and the random effect model is the 
opposite hypothesis. The X
2 estimator with degree of freedom 210 is 831.493; thus the null 
hypothesis is rejected at significant level of 1%. Therefore, the random effect model was used to 
estimate. 
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fixed assets (TANG) and business growth (GROWTH) are insignificant. 
Observing the impacts of state control, we found that the coefficient of the state-
controlled company dummy is positive at the significant level of 10% and that of 
STATE*SIZE is negative at the significant level of 1%. 
Observing the impacts of different stock markets, we found no significant coefficient. 
This means that there is no difference in the short-term fundraising structures of Ho Chi 
Minh Securities Exchange listed companies and Hanoi Securities Exchange listed 
companies. 
 
5.2 Robustness of Estimation Results  
(1) Estimation Results of the Model without Non-debt Tax Shields  
The estimation result of the effective corporate tax rate may be affected by using non-
debt tax shields. In order to check the robustness of the estimation results, we estimated 




(Table 5-2) Estimation Results without the Non-debt Tax Shields Variable 
 
As for estimation results of the total debt ratio, the F statistic and the coefficient of 
determination are 5.406 and 0.246, respectively, almost the same as those of the model 
with non-debt tax shields. In the model with non-debt tax shields, factors whose 
coefficients are significant are business scale (SIZE), operating income rate (PROF), 
state-controlled company dummy (STATE) and STATE*TANG. In the model without 
non-debt tax shields, coefficients of these factors have the same signs as those in the 
model with non-debt tax shields and are highly significant. 
As for estimation results of long-term debt ratio, the F statistic and the coefficient of 
determination are 5.359 and 0.244, respectively, almost the same as those of the model 
with non-debt tax shields. In the model with non-debt tax shields, factors with 
significant coefficients are effective corporate tax rate (TAX), business scale (SIZE), 
fixed assets rate (TANG), state-controlled company dummy (STATE) and STATE*SIZE. 
In the model without non-debt tax shields, except for the coefficient of effective 
corporate tax rate (TAX), the coefficients of the other factors have the same signs as 
those in the model with non-debt tax shields at high significant levels. The sign of the 
                                                  
15 Following the same process as 5.1 to decide the estimation method, the random effect model was 
chosen to estimate the total debt ratio, the long-term debt ratio, the long-term bank loan ratio and 
the short-term debt ratio.  23
coefficient of the effective corporate tax rate (TAX) is unchanged but its significance is 
lower. 
As for estimation results of long-term bank loan ratio, the F statistic and the 
coefficient of determination are 3.966 and 0.180, respectively, almost the same as those 
of the model with non-debt tax shields. In the model with non-debt tax shields, the 
factors with significant coefficients are business scale (SIZE), fixed assets rate (TANG), 
business growth (GROWTH), state-controlled company dummy (STATE) and 
STATE*SIZE. In the model without non-debt tax shields, the coefficients of all the 
factors have the same signs as those in the model with non-debt tax shields at high 
significant levels. 
As for estimation results of short-term debt ratio, the F statistic and the coefficient of 
determination are 4.943 and 0.226, respectively, almost the same as those of the model 
with non-debt tax shields. In the model with non-debt tax shields, the factors with 
significant coefficients are profitability (PROF), state-controlled company dummy 
(STATE) and STATE*SIZE. In the model without non-debt tax shields, except for 
profitability (PROF), the coefficients of the other factors have the same signs as those in 
the model with non-debt tax shields at high significant levels. Profitability (PROF) has 
the same sign but a lower level of significance. 
Generally, estimation results of the model without non-debt tax shields are almost the 
same as those of the model with non-debt tax shields in 5.1. 
 
(2) Estimation Results of the Model without Tobin’s Q  
The correlation coefficient of the operating income rate (as a proxy of internal 
reserves) and Tobin’s Q (as a proxy of business growth) is high. Thus, in order to check 
the robustness of the estimation results of the model in 5.1, we estimated the model 




(Table 5-3) Estimation Results without Tobin’s Q 
 
As for the total debt ratio, the long-term debt ratio, and the long-term bank loan ratio, 
all of the factors that were highly significant in the model of 5.1 are also highly 
significant in this model. Their signs are also unchanged. In other words, among factors 
                                                  
16 Using the same approach as in 5.1 to decide the estimation method, the random effect model was 
chosen to estimate total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, long-term bank loan ratio and short-term 
debt ratio.  24
that were highly significant in this model (Table 5-3), there are no factors that have 
opposite signs at highly significant levels in comparison with the model in 5.1. 
As for short-term debt ratio, except for business profitability (PROF), the factors that 
were highly significant in the model of 5.1 have the same signs at highly significant 
levels in this model. Although the significant level of business profitability (PROF) is 
lower, its sign remains unchanged. In other words, among factors that were highly 
significant in this model (Table 5-3), there are no factors that have opposite signs at 
highly significant levels in comparison with the model in 5.1. 
Generally, estimation results of the model without Tobin’s Q are almost the same as 
those of the model in 5.1. 
 
5.3 Characteristics of Fundraising of Listed Companies in Vietnam 
According to the estimation results in Table 5-1, Vietnamese listed companies have 
the following characteristics
17. First, as to the capital structure of Vietnamese listed 
companies, we could not observe any contradiction to the hypotheses of standard 
corporate finance theory. This means that standard corporate finance theory could be 
proper to the capital structure of Vietnamese listed companies. 
According to the trade-off theory, the higher the effective corporate tax rate is, the 
larger the business scale is, and the more stable the business is, then the higher the 
company’s debt ratio becomes. We could observe that the lower the business risk of 
Vietnamese listed companies is, the higher their total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, 
and long-term bank loan ratio are, at highly significant levels. We also observed that the 
debt ratio tends to become greater at a highly significant level as the effective corporate 
tax rate is higher. 
According to the agency cost theory, debt ratios increase when internal reserves are 
abundant, the ability to provide collateral is high, and Tobin’s Q is low. We observed 
that the total debt ratio and the short-term debt ratio of Vietnamese listed companies 
decrease when the profitability is high or the internal reserves are abundant. We also 
observed the fact that the long-term debt ratio and the long-term bank loan ratio increase 
when the fixed assets rate is high or business growth is low, at highly significant level. 
Second, we found that there are differences between the determinants of long-term 
fundraising and short-term fundraising of Vietnamese listed companies. Moreover, the 
standard corporate finance theories apply better to long-term fundraising. Tax payment 
saving by means of debt and business stability is an important determinant of long-term 
                                                  
17 Besides these characteristics, we also found that construction companies tend to have less long-
term debt. However, we could not determine the implications of this characteristic.  25
fundraising, but does not affect decisions about short-term fundraising. Contrary to this, 
the amount of internal reserves is an important determinant of short-term fundraising, 
but not important for long-term fundraising decisions. The ability to provide collateral 
and the rate of business growth are important determinants for long-term borrowing and 
long-term bank borrowing decisions, but are not important to short-term borrowing 
decisions. The ability to provide collateral is an important determinant for both long-
term and short-term borrowing decisions in non-state-controlled companies. 
Third, we found the differences between fundraising determinants of state-controlled 
companies and those of non-state-controlled companies. The incentive to use debts to 
save tax payments is weaker for state-controlled companies than for non-state-
controlled companies. In raising long-term funds, the business risk of state-controlled 
companies is perceived to be lower than that of other companies
18. 
Fourth, the fundraising structures of the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and the 
Hanoi Securities Exchange are almost the same. We could not observe any difference in 
borrowing determinants when Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange listed companies and 
Hanoi Securities Exchange listed companies had the same fixed assets rate. There is  no 
significant difference in the information asymmetry of companies listed on each stock 
market for outside creditors and outside investors.
19. 
Comparing these estimation results to those of Nguyen (2006) on capital structure 
determinants of Vietnamese small-to-medium companies, we found many interesting 
differences. First, the debt ratios of listed companies are higher than those of small-to-
medium companies. Listed companies are highly trusted by the markets, and their 
information disclosure is better; thus, their agency cost of debt is lower than that of 
small-to-medium companies. For this reason, listed companies have easier access to 
outside debts to increased debt ratios than small-to-medium companies. 
Second, the fundraising structure of listed companies is better explained by standard 
corporate finance theories than that of small-to-medium companies. According to 
Nguyen (2006), the debt ratio decreases as business scale increases. This is contrary to 
our finding. However, the debt ratio of small-to-medium companies decreases as their 
                                                  
18 The average business scale of state-controlled companies is larger than that of other companies; 
thus, state-controlled companies are assumed by the markets to be more stable than other companies. 
This can be interpreted that the long-term debt ratio of state-controlled companies is higher than that 
of non-state-controlled companies. 
19 Recently, there have been many companies that meet the listing conditions of the Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchange but remain listed on the Hanoi Securities Exchange. It is thought that there is 
almost no difference between listing on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and the Hanoi 
Securities Exchange.  26
fixed assets rate increases, and their profitability does not affect their debt ratio. Our 
study did not find any contradiction to the trade-off theory or the agency cost theory. 
The judicial system surrounding listed companies, which constitute the sample of our 
study, is more complete than that of the small-to-medium companies that comprised 
Nguyen’s (2006) sample. 
Third, contrary to Nguyen (2006), our study did not find that state-controlled 
companies or state-owned companies have a higher debt ratio than other companies. We 
did find that the state-controlled companies’ incentive to save tax payments by using 
debt is weaker than that of other companies. We also found that the business risk of 




This study used data from 2006 to 2008 for Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and 
Hanoi Securities Exchange listed companies that are representative of Vietnamese 
companies, in order to investigate their fundraising determinants. According to the 
estimation results, we observed many interesting findings. 
(1) The trade-off theory and the agency cost theory are well explanatory of the 
fundraising structure of listed companies. (2) The ability to provide collateral is an 
important determinant in long-term fundraising, even for listed companies that are 
perceived to be the best in Vietnam. (3) The incentive for state-controlled companies to 
use debt to save tax payments is weaker than it is for other companies. (4) In raising 
long-term funds, state-controlled companies are perceived to be less risky than other 
companies. (5) There is no statistically significant difference between the fundraising 
determinants of companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Securities Exchanges. 
Compared with the estimation results of Nguyen (2006) and Biger et al. (2008), we 
found interesting differences. (1) The debt ratio of listed companies is much higher than 
that of small-to-medium companies. (2) The fundraising structure of listed companies 
matches better with standard theoretical corporate finance theories than does that of 
small-medium companies. 
We could derive three policy implications from the estimation results of our study. 
First, according to the estimation results, fundraising determinants of listed Vietnamese 
companies is well explained by the agency cost theory. This means that the fundraising 
activities of listed Vietnamese companies can be explained by the economic rationality 
that is often observed in developed countries. Almost all the companies in the samples 
of Nguyen (2006) and Biger et al. (2008) have low information disclosure; thus the  27
information asymmetry between the companies and their outside creditors and outside 
investors is high. The judicial system surrounding listed companies is more robust than 
that surrounding small-to-medium companies, with the result that information 
disclosure and corporate management are more suitable for raising funds from markets. 
These facts imply that the economic reform implemented by the Vietnamese 
government, which is aiming at economy marketization, has achieved some goals in 
term of corporate finance. 
Second, we found that even listed non-state-owned Vietnamese companies that are 
representative of all Vietnamese companies need to provide collateral when raising 
long-term funds. In most developing countries, collateral is not explained properly and 
the rights of creditors are not preserved well, eroding creditor confidence and negatively 
affecting companies’ ability to raise funds. To make things worse, the problem of 
financing without proper debtor valuation is often observed in developing countries. In 
order to prevent these problems in Vietnam in the future, it is important to update the 
system of using collateral with better regard for creditor protection and the suitable 
collateral valuation. 
Third, we also found that the incentive for state-controlled companies to use debt to 
save tax payments is weaker than it is for other companies, and that business risk of 
state-controlled companies is perceived to be less than that of other companies. The fact 
is that the incentive to use debt to save tax payments may be rational to the government, 
which at the same time gets the tax payments as income, but not be rational to outside 
investors because it reduces the company’s value. As a further complication, the 
government’s risk distribution of across all state-controlled companies also makes 
corporate governance and financial health unclear and causes the companies’ value to 
decrease from the perspective of external investors. In order to reduce the severity of 
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Table 2-1 Privatization of State-owned Companies in Vietnam 
Regulation on equitization of State-owned companies （7/5/1996） 
Object companies: State-owned companies that satisfy 3 conditions: ① Small-medium companies, ② 
There is no need for state to hold 100% ownership, ③ There is an efficient investment plan.  
Methods of equitization: ① Equitizing state-owned captial and letting state own all of this capital 
along with increasing capital by issuing new equities, ②Equitizing state-owned captial and selling a 
part of this capital, ③ Dividing company into parts and equitizing only the part that satisfies 
equitizing conditions.  
Regulation on equitization of State-owned companies (revised) （29/6/1998） 
Object companies: State-owned companies that there is no need for state to hold 100% ownership.  
Methods of equitization: ① Equitizing state-owned captial and letting state own all of this capital 
along with increasing capital by issuing new equities, ②Equitizing state-owned captial and selling a 
part of this capital, ③Equitizing state-owned captial and selling all of this capital, ④Dividing 
company into parts and equitizing only the part that satisfies equitizing conditions. 
Regulation on equitization of State-owned companies (revised) （19/6/2002） 
Object companies: No changes  
Methods of equitization: ① Equitizing state-owned captial and letting state own all of this capital 
along with increasing capital by issuing new equities, ② Equitizing state-owned captial and selling a 
part of this capital, ￿ Equitizing state-owned captial and selling a part of this capital along with 
increasing capital by issuing new equities, ￿ Equitizing state-owned captial and selling all of this 
capital, ￿ Equitizing state-owned captial and selling all of this capital, along with increasing capital 
by issuing new equities.  
Priority sequence of  ownership: ￿ State (in case of remaining state ownership), ￿ Employees of 
equitized companies, ￿ Material suppliers (in case of companies of agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries), ￿ Outside investors (At least 30% of capital. Investors with technology, markets, capital, 
management skills are preceded.   
Regulation on equitization of foreign-owned companies （15/4/2003） 
Object companies: Foreign-owned companies that have been running at least 3 years and made profit 
in previous year of applying for equitizing.  
Conditions of post-equitization: There  is at least one foreigner among establishers whose investment 
is at least 30% of the total capital. 
Regulation on equitization of State-owned companies (revised) （16/11/2004） 
Object companies: No changes  
Methods of equitization: No changes.  
Priority sequence of  ownership: ①State (in case of remaining state ownership), ￿ Employees of 
equitized companies,③ Strategy investors (at most 20% of capital), ④ Public sale (at least 20% of 
capital).  
Simultaneity of equitizing and listing of state-owned companies (4/8/2005) 
State-owned companies that satisfy listing conditions of Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange or Ha Noi 
Securities Exchange can equitize and list at the same time.  
Regulation on issuing company bonds （19/5/2006） 
Object companies: joint-stock companies, state-owned companies that have become joint-stock 
companies or limited liability companies, foreign-owned companies.  
Regulation on equitization of State-owned companies (revised) （26/6/2007） 
Object companies: No changes  
Methods of equitization: No changes. 
Priority sequence of  ownership: ①State (in case of remaining state ownership), ￿ Strategy investors 
and other investors (at least 25% of capital, at least 50% of this is sold to other investors), ③ Labor 
uinons of equitized companies (at most 3% of capital), ④Employees of equitized companies. 
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Table 2-2 Listing Conditions for the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 
Conditions  Ha Noi Securities Exchanges  Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 
Minimum 
capital 
10 billion VND  8 billion VND 
Business 
performance 
have made a profit in the year 
before listing (excluding privatized 
state-owned companies, newly 
established companies of 
infrastructure industry and high-
tech industry. 
have made profits in two years before 
listing 
 
Voting  shares  Have to be possessed by at least 
100 shareholders.  
At least 20% of voting shares have to be 
possessed by at least 100 shareholders.  





Table 2-3 The Number, Trading Amount, and Market Value of Listed Companies  
Number of Listed 
Companies 








HASE HOSE  HASE  HOSE HASE  HOSE  Tril. 
VND 
%GDP
2000 0  5  0 300 0 90  na    na
2001 0  11  0 1,900 0 964  na    na
2002   0  20  0 3,500 0 959  na   na
2003 0  22  0 2,800 0 502  na    na
2004 0  28  0 7,300 0 1,971  4  0.6
2005 6  35  20 9,400 0.26 2,784  10  1.2
2006 81  106  95 53,800 3.91 35,472  221  22.7
2007 110  141  612 181,400 63.42 217,835  491  43.7
2008 168  172  153 297,700 57.12 124,576  210  17.0
Source: Homepages of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 
Note: All are shown in year-end value. HASE means  Hanoi Securities Exchanges, HOSE means 











Table 2-4 Corporate Tax on Listed Companies in Vietnam  
Corporate Tax Law (17/6/2003） 
  （１） Tax rate: 28% 
（２） Preference tax rate: ① Applying tax rate of 20%, 15%, 10% for the companies that are 
newly established in preference industries or preference areas, ② Applying tax exemption 
(at most 4 years) and half reduction (at most next 9 years) for the companies that are 
moved to preference areas, ③ Applying tax exemption (at most 4 years) and half 
reduction (at most next 7 years) for the increasing profit of the companies that apply new 
production line or new technology.  
Regulation on tax preferences for listed companies (20/10/2004) 
  ① Applying tax exemption in 2 years after listing for newly listed companies, ② If listing is 
not at the beginning of the year, tax exemption could be caculated from next year, ③ If 
Preferences of Corporate Tax Law are being applied, this preference could be applied after 
applying those preferences.  
Nullification of Regulation on tax preferences for listed companies (8/9/2006) 
  ① For the companies listing after 1/1/2007, preferences of above regulation are not applied, ②
For the companies listing before 1/1/2007, preferences of above regulation are applied.  






Table 2-5 Breakdown of Listed Companies by Industry  
Ha Noi Securities 
Exchanges 



















4 2.38 15 8.77 19  5.60
Construction 67  39.88 27 15.79 94  27.73
Manufacturing 54  32.14 68 39.77 122  35.99
Mining 8  4.76 4 2.34 12  3.54
Power 4  2.38 5 2.92 9  2.65
Service 11  6.55 7 4.09 18  5.31
Carrier 8  4.76 19 11.11 27  7.96
Finance 6  3.57 4 2.34 10  2.95
Communication 3  1.79 2 1.17 5  1.47
Real estate  1  0.60 6 3.51 7  2.06
Commerce 2  1.19 14 8.19 16  4.72
Total 168  100 172 100 340 100
Source: Homepages of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 
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Table 4-1: Breakdown of the Sample by Industry and State-control of the Company 
Ha Noi Securities 
Exchanges 
Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchanges
Total 









Agricultural  0 (0)  11 (0)  11 (0) 
Construction  40 (20)  18 (3)  58 (23) 
Manufacturing  30 (17)  46 (14)  76 (31) 
Mining  2 (1)  3 (1)  5 (2) 
Power  4 (4)  4 (3)  8 (7) 
Service  8 (3)  4 (1)  12 (4) 
Carrier  8 (7)  12 (6)  20 (13) 
Communication  1 (0)  1 (0)  2 (0) 
Real estate  1 (1)  5 (1)  6 (2) 
Commerce 1  (0)  12 (2)  13 (2) 
Total  95 (53)  116 (31)  211 (84) 





Table 4-2 Comparison of State-controlled and Non-state-controlled Companies 
  











Total  debt  ratio  0.577 0.521 0.424 0.429 
Long-term debt ratio 0.116  0.102  0.117  0.076 
Long-term bank 
loan  ratio  0.070 0.072 0.073 0.048 
Total  assets  4321.1 2638.5 8754.7 6599.1 
Fix  assets  ratio  0.283 0.297 0.381 0.272 
Operating  profit  0.109 0.132 0.154 0.124 
Tobin’s  Q  1.653 2.042 2.476 2.131 
Effective  tax  rate  0.118 0.121 0.093 0.133 
Depreciation  rate    0.045 0.045 0.052 0.031 
Source: Homepages of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 








Table 4-3 Basic Statistics of the Main Variables 
  DR LDR LBR SIZE TANG PROF Growth TAX  NDTS
 Mean   0.483   0.097   0.062  26.094  0.295  0.126  2.045   0.100   0.040 
 Median   0.500   0.031   0.000  26.047  0.254  0.110  1.580   0.097   0.033 
 Maximum   1.000   0.693   0.693  29.786  0.939  0.591  17.518   0.362   0.208 
 Minimum   0.034   0.000   0.000  22.844  0.002  0.008  0.346   0.000   0.000 
 Std. Dev.   0.229  0.1389   0.112  1.340  0.200  0.074  1.484   0.082   0.032 






Table 4-4 Correlation coefficients of explanatory variables  
  SIZE TANG  PROF  GROWTH TAX NDTS  STATE  HOSE
SIZE    1     
TANG   0.0226   1     
PROF  -0.2317   0.0306   1    
GROWTH   0.0813  -0.0243   0.4451  1    
TAX  -0.1775  -0.1660   0.1555  0.0550  1    
NDTS  -0.2814   0.4330   0.2326 -0.0336 -0.1664  1   
STATE  -0.0053   0.0945  -0.0117 -0.0488 -0.2440  0.1789   1 















Table 5-1 Estimation Results of Debt Ratios. 





loan ratio LBR 
Short-term debt 
SDR  Variable 
Coeffic
ient Prob.   
Coeffic
ient Prob.  
Coeffic
ient Prob.   
 Coeffic
ient Prob.  
C  -0.331 0.5073   -0.559 0.0651 ** -0.546 0.0172 **  0.224 0.6380  
TAX(-1)  0.240 0.3136   0.303 0.0336 ** 0.148 0.1344   -0.066 0.7782  
NDTS(-1)  0.316 0.5877   0.241 0.4900   0.315 0.2012   0.178 0.7544  
SIZE(-1)  0.031 0.0920 *  0.028 0.0448 ** 0.021 0.0129 **  0.010 0.5911  
PROF(-1)  -0.727 0.0301 ** -0.220 0.2724   0.031 0.8289   -0.569 0.0815 * 
TANG(-1)  0.117 0.2880   0.246 0.0002 *** 0.153 0.0016 ***  -0.171 0.1068  
GROWTH(-1)  0.008 0.4953   -0.011 0.1209   -0.010 0.0406 **  0.017 0.1400  
         
STATE  0.593 0.2462   -0.677 0.0284 ** -0.463 0.0392 **  1.175 0.0178 **
STATE*TAX(-1)  -0.491 0.0398 ** -0.130 0.3613   -0.155 0.1134   -0.325 0.1674  
STATE*NDTS(-1)  -0.916 0.1552   -0.136 0.7231   -0.140 0.5990   -0.751 0.2362  
STATE*SIZE(-1)  -0.012 0.5228   0.027 0.0230 ** 0.019 0.0239 **  -0.036 0.0562 * 
STATE*PROF(-1)  -0.288 0.3871   0.117 0.5558   -0.073 0.6027   -0.382 0.2413  
STATE*TANG(-1)  -0.194 0.0927 *  -0.027 0.6918   0.026 0.6029   -0.156 0.1648  
STATE*GROWTH(-1)  -0.018 0.2547   -0.005 0.5784   0.001 0.8493   -0.014 0.3739  
          
HOSE  -0.007 0.9897   -0.058 0.8659   0.276 0.2946   0.098 0.8571  
HOSE*TAX(-1)  -0.214 0.3911   -0.205 0.1714   -0.048 0.6403   -0.038 0.8773  
HOSE*NDTS(-1)  0.476 0.5358   -0.114 0.8058   -0.543 0.1046   0.389 0.6017  
HOSE*SIZE(-1)  -0.002 0.9073   0.002 0.8718   -0.010 0.2888   -0.006 0.7481  
HOSE*PROF(-1)  0.266 0.4705   0.023 0.9158   -0.015 0.9257   0.277 0.4392  
HOSE*TANG(-1)  -0.070 0.5595   -0.114 0.1167 -0.041 0.4442   0.065 0.5740  
HOSE*GROWTH(-1)  -0.012 0.3385   0.009 0.2310 0.005 0.3383   -0.019 0.1169  
        
YD2007  0.037 0.0022 *** 0.009 0.1929 0.007 0.1738   0.028 0.0189 **
         
CONS  0.073 0.2455   0.039 0.3063 0.020 0.5178   0.036 0.5411  
MANU  -0.037 0.5420   0.004 0.9055   -0.007 0.8220   -0.036 0.5205  
MIN  -0.133 0.1790   0.026 0.6650   0.023 0.6359   -0.149 0.1072  
POWE  -0.037 0.6934   0.182 0.0015 *** -0.041 0.3690   -0.206 0.0189 **
SERV  -0.036 0.6530   0.024 0.6167   0.004 0.9284   -0.053 0.4695  
CARR  -0.021 0.7753   0.080 0.0691   0.077 0.0310 **  -0.091 40.175  
COMM  0.048 0.7361   -0.091 0.2994   -0.043 0.5443   0.142 0.2868  
REAL  0.212 0.0261 ** 0.096 0.0980 *  0.001 0.9794   0.115 0.1939  
COM  0.004 0.9574   -0.005 0.9162   -0.030 0.4101   0.0100 0.8871  
Adjusted R-squared  0.250  0.245 0.168     0.226
F-statistic  (Prob. )  5.026  (0.000) 4.9258 (0.000) 3.444 (0.000)    4.490 (0.000)
Obs  364   364  364     364  
Note: ***，**，* indicate significance at 1％, 5％, 10％ levels. 
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Table 5-2 Estimation Results without the Non-debt Tax Shields Variable 





loan ratio LBR 
Short-term debt 
SDR  Variable 
Coeffic
ient Prob.   
Coeffic
ient Prob.  
Coeffic
ient Prob.   
 Coeffic
ient Prob.  
C  -0.411 0.3790   -0.494 0.0881 *  -0.478 0.0342 **  0.089 0.8433  
TAX(-1)  0.097 0.6646   0.194 0.1637   0.030 0.7737   -0.118 0.5948  
NDTS(-1)  －  －   － －   － －   － －  
SIZE(-1)  0.034 0.0511 *  0.020 0.0589 *  0.019 0.0237 **  0.014 0.3907  
PROF(-1)  -0.526 0.0817 *  -0.090 0.6288   0.188 0.1764   -0.476 0.1104  
TANG(-1)  0.149 0.1487   0.255 0.0001 *** 0.182 0.0002 ***  -0.142 0.1531  
GROWTH(-1)  0.004 0.7362   -0.012 0.0825 *  -0.011 0.0326 **  0.014 0.2394  
          
STATE  0.518 0.2838   -0.665 0.0265 ** -0.45 0.0472 **  1.087 0.0210 **
STATE*TAX(-1)  -0.471 0.0403 ** -0.217 0.1306   -0.259 0.0128 **  -0.217 0.3423  
STATE*NDTS(-1)  －  －   － －   － －   － －  
STATE*SIZE(-1)  -0.010 0.5824   0.026 0.0213 ** 0.019 0.0301 **  -0.033 0.0639 * 
STATE*PROF(-1)  -0.342 0.2896   0.178 0.3724   0.00 0.9798   -0.495 0.1213  
STATE*TANG(-1)  -0.276 0.0097 *** -0.05 0.3862   -0.001 0.9792   -0.209 0.0449 **
STATE*GROWTH(-1)  -0.014 0.3556   -0.007 0.4763   -0.001 0.9139   -0.001 0.5607  
          
HOSE  0.218 0.6845   -0.079 0.8129   0.001 0.5000   0.310 0.5461  
HOSE*TAX(-1)  -0.081 0.7321   -0.077 0.6001   0.105 0.3288   -0.022 0.9277  
HOSE*NDTS(-1)  －  －   － －   － －   － －  
HOSE*SIZE(-1)  -0.011 0.5995   0.003 0.8340   -0.007 0.4697   -0.014 0.4656  
HOSE*PROF(-1)  0.135 0.6929   -0.130 0.5388   -0.247 0.1182   0.248 0.4587  
HOSE*TANG(-1)  -0.061 0.5903   -0.100 0.1556 -0.050 0.3540   0.057 0.6017  
HOSE*GROWTH(-1)  -0.009 0.4674   0.011 0.1477 0.007 0.1993   -0.017 0.1595  
         
YD2007  0.035 0.0029 *** 0.007 0.3385 0.004 0.4874   0.029 0.0171 **
        
CONS  0.085 0.1727   0.040 0.2944   0.015 0.6252   0.046 0.4307  
MANU  -0.026 0.6589   0.004 0.9026   -0.012 0.6888   -0.027 0.6298  
MIN  -0.123 0.2118   0.025 0.6851   0.019 0.7071   -0.135 0.1427  
POWE  -0.014 0.8785   0.185 0.0012 *** -0.052 0.2563   -0.19 0.0271 **
SERV  -0.021 0.7862   0.024 0.6258   -0.005 0.8937   -0.040 0.5828  
CARR  -0.007 0.9209   0.076 0.0812 *  0.062 0.0821 *  -0.075 0.2491  
COMM  0.080 0.5711   -0.081 0.3560   -0.042 0.5595   0.163 0.2175  
REAL  0.226 0.0170 ** 0.104 0.0759 *  0.010 0.8328   0.123 0.1640  
COM  0.002 0.9796   -0.006 0.9010   -0.030 0.4236   0.010 0.8822  
Adjusted R-squared  0.246  0.244 0.180     0.226
F-statistic  (Prob. )  5.406  (0.000) 5.359 (0.000) 3.966 (0.000)    4.943 (0.000)
Obs  366   366  366     366  
Note: ***，**，* indicate significance at 1％, 5％, 10％ levels. 
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Table 5-3 Estimation Results without Tobin’s Q 
Total debt ratio  
DR 
Long-term debt ratio 
LDR 
Long-term bank 
loan ratio LBR 
Short-term debt 
SDR  Variable 
Coeffic
ient Prob.   
Coeffic
ient Prob.  
Coeffi
cient Prob.   
 Coeffic
ient Prob.  
C  -0.448 0.371   -0.523 0.077 * -0.504 0.027  **  0.081 0.081  
TAX(-1)  0.237 0.324   0.271 0.056 * 0.116 0.246    -0.046 -0.046  
NDTS(-1)  0.290 0.623   0.287 0.411  0.353 0.156    0.107 0.107  
SIZE(-1)  0.036 0.050 ** 0.021 0.057 * 0.020 0.021  **  0.016 0.016  
PROF(-1)  -0.634 0.030 ** -0.358 0.040 ** -0.122 0.331   -0.371 -0.371  
TANG(-1)  0.114 0.305   0.254 0.000 *** 0.165 0.001 ***  -0.184 -0.184 * 
GROWTH(-1)  －  －   － －   －   － －  
          
STATE  0.750 0.137   -0.669 0.026 ** -0.517 0.020 **  1.302 0.007 ***
STATE*TAX(-1)  -0.496 0.039 ** -0.093 0.511   -0.120 0.221   -0.349 0.141  
STATE*NDTS(-1)  -0.889 0.169   -0.136 0.722   -0.175 0.514   -0.698 0.273  
STATE*SIZE(-1)  -0.020 0.288   0.025 0.024 ** 0.021 0.013 **  -0.042 0.021 **
STATE*PROF(-1)  -0.303 0.274   0.194 0.238   0.081 0.482   -0.462 0.090 * 
STATE*TANG(-1)  -0.189 0.106   -0.033 0.635   0.021 0.673   -0.149 0.1899  
STATE*GROWTH(-1)  －  －   － －   － －   － －  
          
HOSE  0.173 0.761   -0.085 0.802   0.258 0.322   0.303 0.303  
HOSE*TAX(-1)  -0.199 0.428   -0.173 0.245   -0.033 0.756   -0.056 -0.056  
HOSE*NDTS(-1)  0.543 0.485   -0.181 0.696   -0.572 0.091   0.495 0.495  
HOSE*SIZE(-1)  -0.010 0.634   0.004 0.780   -0.009 0.327   -0.015 -0.015  
HOSE*PROF(-1)  0.101 0.769   0.108 0.596   0.020 0.892   0.038 0.038  
HOSE*TANG(-1)  -0.067 0.579   -0.122 0.092 *  -0.049 0.356   0.075 0.075  
HOSE*GROWTH(-1)  －  －   － － － －   － －  
         
YD2007  0.039 0.001 *** 0.014 0.0440 ** 0.010 0.024 **  0.027 0.021 **
           
CONS  0.072 0.263   0.041 0.296   0.020 0.528   0.035 0.558  
MANU  -0.042 0.493   0.002 0.956   -0.009 0.762   -0.038 0.498  
MIN  -0.128 0.204   0.015 0.809   0.011 0.820   -0.131 0.155  
POWE  -0.033 0.728   0.186 0.001 *** -0.041 0.373   -0.203 0.022  
SERV  -0.043 0.596   0.018 0.717   -0.002 0.959   -0.054 0.467  
CARR  -0.021 0.779   0.082 0.064 *  0.077 0.030 **  -0.090 0.183  
COMM  0.040 0.782   -0.093 0.293   -0.049 0.485   0.137 0.308  
REAL  0.210 0.031   0.093 0.111   -0.000 0.998   0.116 0.196  
COM  0.004 0.960   -0.005 0.919   -0.027 0.458   0.010 0.882  
Adjusted R-squared  0.249  0.242 0.167     0.225
F-statistic  (Prob. )  5.468  (0.000) 5.296 (0.000) 3.700 (0.000)    4.917 (0.000)
Obs 364    364   364     36  









“Doi Moi”)  
Monobank system: There is no separation of the functions of financial 
institutions.  
Regulation on interest rate is independent of foreign interest rate. 
Nominal interest rate is lower than inflation rate, thus real interest rate is 
minus.  
26/3/1988  Separation of the functions of the state bank and commercial banks. 
According to 53/HDBT Order.  
1989 ～ 5/1992 
 
Fixed interest rate regime. 
Interest rate is adjusted in relation with the fluctuation of price index.  
Interest rates of foreign currencies are those of world market.  
6/1992 ～1995  Limited interest rate regime 
State Bank of Vietnam fixes the lower limit of deposit interest rate and 
the ceiling of lending interest rate. Commercial banks decide their interest 
rates basing on those interest rates. 
1996 ～ 7/2000  Ceiling interest rate regime 
Deposit interest rate is liberated, ceiling of lending interest rate is fixed.  
8/2000 ～ 5/2002  Basic interest rate and Flexible interest rate regime 
Basic interest rate and allowed movement rate are announced monthly.  In 
neccesity, State Bank will announce proper adjustment. Commercial 
banks negotiate with borrowers and decide lending interest rate basing on 
these rates. 
5/2001 ～ Present  Liberalization of interest rates of foreign currencies 
Interest rates of foreign currencies are decided basing on their interest 
rates on world markets and their demand and supply in domestic market.  
6/2002 ～ Present 
 
 
Expansion of liberalization of deposit interest rate and lending interest rate. 
Liberating deposit interest rate and lending interest rate of VND.  
Setting ceiling for deposit interest rate of USD of companies, but 
liberating deposit interest rate of USD of individuals.  
Source:  Homepage of State Bank 